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*I.C.L.Q. 385 Abstract The Indian Constitution embraces economic and social rights as directive
principles of state policy, ostensibly insulated from judicial review. The Supreme Court's interpretation
of traditional civil and political rights to include economic and social guarantees has been praised by
academics and activists keen to advance the cause of justiciable economic and social rights. In
recent commentary, however, the extent to which the court's jurisprudence furthers the goal of
increasing access to goods such as health care, housing, food and water for India's poor, is
questioned. This article reconsiders the court's record in this area. It suggests that a more realistic
assessment of the court's jurisprudence is necessary and draws on the South African experience of
economic and social rights adjudication to argue for more serious engagement with factors that inform
the level of judicial activism or restraint applied in the cases.
Keywords: adjudication, directive principles of state policy, economic and social rights, India, South
Africa.
I. INTRODUCTION
For a number of democracies around the world, the last two decades have seen a steady expansion
in judicial powers of review in cases where human rights are implicated. With the proliferation of
human rights treaties at an international level has come corresponding pressure on states to
incorporate human rights provisions into domestic legislation. Increasingly, courts are seen as
important tools in the implementation of treaty obligations at a national level. And national
experiences of human rights protection now exert a strong influence over the development of
international human rights law. Despite this, *I.C.L.Q. 386 the capacity of courts to interrogate and
overturn governmental acts on the basis that these acts conflict with fundamental human rights is the
subject of a great deal of controversy. The contentious nature of judicial review in human rights
matters is even more pronounced when it comes to economic and social rights (ESR). This is due
largely to the perception that ESR adjudication, by definition, involves courts in politically sensitive
matters that are outside both their constitutional mandate and institutional expertise.
For some time, the preoccupation with the justiciability of ESR--the question of whether judges should
be pronouncing on these rights at all--diverted attention away from the issue of how courts may most
effectively contribute to the implementation of these rights. But there is now a substantial body of
academic, judicial and political analysis dedicated to showing that sharp distinctions between ESR, on
the one hand, and civil and political rights, on the other, are impossible to sustain.1 This development,
together with more widespread constitutionalization of the rights in national jurisdictions,2 has moved
the debate forward. Whilst sceptics of judicial review remain, it has become more difficult for them to
adopt a categorical position that insulates social and economic interests from judicial consideration.
Indian Supreme Court judgments on ESR have elicited praise, at least in academic and media circles,
3 for their legal creativity4 and the clear demands they make of government.5 But recent scholarship
questions the extent *I.C.L.Q. 387 to which judges of the Supreme Court are committed to judicial
activism on behalf of India's poor. In addition, irrespective of whether judgments favour the poor and
the vulnerable, they are tainted by weaknesses in judicial reasoning. This article argues that these
weaknesses are mainly a function of express or implicit disagreement amongst judges about the
nature and limits of their role and that those with an interest in using courts to further the protection of
Page1
ESR must engage more seriously with the notions of judicial activism and restraint in order to develop
a principled and robust approach to adjudication in this area.
Although South Africa's first democratic Constitution was drafted several decades after India's, the
South African experience of ESR adjudication makes a useful comparative study. Many scholars
have criticized the South African Constitutional Court judges for focusing on procedural values such
as a fair hearing in their ESR jurisprudence, thereby failing to give real content to ESR.6 There is merit
to the argument that the South African Constitutional Court has been too cautious in certain ESR
cases.7 But, as a general approach, the judges' responsiveness to concerns about the
appropriateness and effectiveness of ESR adjudication is both necessary and useful. By contrast, as
noted by Cottrell and Ghai, the judges of the Indian Supreme Court ‘have been less rigorous in
discussing their constitutional status and mandate regarding rights, and have been less deferential to
the legislature’.8 The argument in this article is that the failure to properly engage with ideas about
judicial restraint and intervention has resulted in a disturbing amount of incongruity in the resulting
Indian ESR jurisprudence. The Indian experience of adjudicating constitutional social and economic
guarantees is, by comparison with other jurisdictions, both long-standing and vast. There is much to
be learnt, but only from a realistic assessment of this jurisprudence.
II. EXPANDING ARTICLE 21: DIGNITY, DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES AND MINIMUM
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT
The constitutional provisions dealing with health care, housing, water, etc in India and South Africa
were very much informed by concerns about the limits of the judicial role; the need to respect
democratic decision-making processes; and a desire for decisions about the distribution of limited
resources to be made by those with more experience in economic and social policy-making than
*I.C.L.Q. 388 judges.9 But the status given to the rights in the constitutional texts is very different.
The South African Constituent Assembly opted to include a series of directly justiciable ESR in the
1996 Constitution. As a result of this then fairly radical step, the ESR contained in the South African
Constitution are quite carefully circumscribed. Each of the two main provisions--section 26 (housing)
and section 27 (health care, food, water and social security) begins with a general statement of the
rights but these sections also contain internal limitations. The identically-worded sections 26(2) and
27(2), which draw heavily upon the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), limit the state's obligations to ‘reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation’ of the rights set out in sections 26(1) and
27(1). In this respect, the South African Constitution mirrors the growing consensus in international
human rights law in that, whilst it recognizes the importance of ESR and the benefits of some judicial
intervention in implementing these rights, it also is concerned to contain the judicial role to what is
appropriate and useful.
By contrast, the Indian Constitution protects interests in social and economic goods only as
non-justiciable directive principles of state policy.10 Despite this, in its decisions following the 1975
state of emergency, the Supreme Court began to interpret civil and political rights--mainly the right to
life, protected in Article 21--to include economic and social guarantees protected in the directive
principles. The court has found that Article 21 encompasses a right to adequate medical facilities or
health care,11 and a right to livelihood.12 It has also interpreted other fundamental rights in light of
directive principles--for instance, the right to equality before the law in Article 14, as interpreted by the
court, includes a right to education.13
*I.C.L.Q. 389 The Indian Supreme Court's interpretation of civil and political rights to include access
to economic and social goods contained in the directive principles was foreshadowed by its
increasingly expansive approach to the right to life and personal liberty in Article 21.14 In cases like
Francis Mullin, the court emphasized that the right to life included protection of human dignity and
access to the ‘bare necessaries of life’ like clothing, food and shelter.15 The 1986 Olga Tellis 16
decision was one of the Indian Supreme Court's most celebrated cases. The petitioners were
pavement and slum dwellers living in deplorable conditions in the then city of Bombay. Attempts by
the state to remove the petitioners were unsuccessful. Needing to be close to their places of work,17
they returned and rebuilt their homes.18 In a unanimous judgment, the judges held that the rights to an
adequate means of livelihood and to work, protected as directive principles of state policy in Articles
39(a) and 41, respectively, were, ‘equally fundamental in the understanding and interpretation of the
meaning and content of fundamental rights’.19 Depriving a person of his or her livelihood would have
the effect of making life impossible to live and was, thus, a violation of the right to life.20 The state had
an obligation not to deprive someone of the right to a livelihood or work without following a fair, just
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and reasonable procedure established by law.21
The court noted that the pavement dwellings forced the public to use busy roads as thoroughfares
and were, therefore, a nuisance and a safety hazard.22 The judges went on to find that the petitioners
in this case should have been given a hearing before they were evicted but that this opportunity had,
in any event, been provided to them in the course of the hearings before the Supreme Court. In light
of the impact of the dwellings on pedestrians, the governmental decision to remove the dwellers and
their dwellings was, in fact, reasonable.23
Chief Justice Chandrachud directed that none of the dwellers be removed until a month after the
monsoon season.24 The court held that the government's undertaking to provide alternative pitches for
the pavement dwellers with census cards should be met, but did not make this a condition of the
evictions.25 Slum dwellers with census cards had to be offered alternative accommodation before they
could be removed.26 Those slums which had existed for more than 20 years and in which
improvements had been made could not be demolished unless the land was required for a public
purpose. And, where the land was required for such a purpose, the state had to move the affected
individuals on to an alternative site before it could proceed with any demolition.27
*I.C.L.Q. 390 Although Olga Tellis has come to be regarded by some as groundbreaking judicial
confirmation that the right to life includes a right to shelter,28 the discussion above indicates that the
court's findings were more limited than that implies. Nevertheless, Scott and Macklem argue that
those aspects of the court order dealing with provision of alternative sites for the affected individuals
and the need for existing government shelter and slum improvement programmes to be pursued in
earnest were intended to get government to address the broad, systemic problems with provision of
housing or, at least, to ‘engender political dialogue’ about the issues involved.29
The potential benefits of remedies which focus on ameliorating the harsh effects of evictions;
encouraging dialogue in finding solutions to housing crises; and holding government to its own
undertakings are highlighted by the South African housing jurisprudence, developed some two
decades later. By the time the now well-known Grootboom case came before the Constitutional
Court, the Cape Metropolitan Council had already conceded that its housing programme needed to
be amended to cater for people in crisis situations.30 In an order handed down before its decision on
the reasonableness of the housing programme, the Constitutional Court essentially gave formal
judicial recognition to an agreement reached between the parties.31 The remedy set out several
conditions which the temporary accommodation had to meet. These related to provision of water and
sanitation; and protection from inclement weather. In subsequent cases, where there has been less
agreement between the state and affected individuals, the Court has emphasized the importance of
procedural fairness in evictions proceedings. It has also fashioned orders making the provision of
temporary accommodation by the state a prerequisite of eviction and detailing the quality required of
this accommodation.32 Some of these decisions have been criticized for not going far enough.
Scholars have argued that the jurisprudence does not clarify the state's obligations with respect to the
right to housing. Furthermore, the court's reluctance to order court supervision of judgments through
structural interdicts is viewed by some as a weakness in its approach to ESR adjudication.33
*I.C.L.Q. 391 But the problems with the decision in Olga Tellis were much more serious than this.
The court made it quite clear that there was no positive obligation on the state to provide people with
shelter or an adequate means of livelihood.34 Given the fact that the court was relying on the directive
principles and not on a justiciable right, this level of restraint was understandable. However, the court
also accepted that the state could demolish dwellings without notice to affected parties in urgent
cases.35 In respect of the pavement dwellers, their eviction was not made conditional on the provision
of alternative accommodation.36 Moreover, although the court has confirmed the finding that the right
to life includes a right to shelter or ‘reasonable accommodation’,37 it has not yet found that the right to
livelihood and, therefore, the right to life would be breached by the eviction of people living in slums or
on the pavements. It has also not yet held that eviction is conditional on government making provision
for the relocation and settlement of slum and pavement dwellers on suitable alternative sites.38
In cases like Francis Mullin and Olga Tellis the judges had moved constitutional interpretation up a
gear, applying a significant amount of judicial creativity to the cases before them. Policy
considerations were no longer a bar to justiciability in cases dealing with fundamental rights and
directive principles.39 But it is important not to claim more for these cases than the judgments actually
support. The Court's inclusive approach to the scope of the right to life did not often translate into
positive obligations on the state or even a willingness to impose more onerous procedural
requirements on the government than those which already existed in the legislation.40 The cases
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cannot simply be read as the beginning of a movement aimed at the judicial implementation of ESR
through the directive principles. This is clear from the cases themselves but also from the subsequent
development of the jurisprudence.
*I.C.L.Q. 392 III. A RETREAT FROM JUDICIAL ACTIVISM?
As noted earlier, the image of the Indian Supreme Court as tireless protector of the marginalized, and
the perception that it enjoys widespread public support and respect are contested.41 Examined more
closely, the record of the Indian Supreme Court in protecting ESR is not one of consistent judicial
activism in securing these rights. There are a number of cases that support this point.
In Calcutta Electricity Supply Corporation (CESC) Ltd Etc v Subash Chandra Bose and Ors, 42 for
instance, the issue was whether people working for the respondent, which CESC had contracted to
carry out work related to public roads, fell within the definition of ‘employee’ in the State Insurance
Act, 1978. If they did, the respondent would have had to pay contributions to the Employment
Insurance Fund and the workers would have been entitled to the relevant health and welfare benefits.
The Act defined an employee as someone who is, inter alia ‘employed by or through an immediate
employer on the premises of the factory or establishment or under the supervision of the principal
employer or his agent’.43
Adopting an approach to constitutional interpretation consistent with the court's post-emergency
jurisprudence, described above, Ramaswamy J referred to international sources on health and
workers' rights,44 Article 39(c) of the Indian Constitution45 and the purpose of the Act-to extend health
benefits and ‘relieve employees from occupational hazards consistent with the constitutional and
human rights scheme’.46 He held that the degree of supervision necessary depended on the nature of
the work and that the term was broad enough to include legal control of the work, as existed in this
case.47 But a majority of the judges held that CESC's final acceptance or rejection of the work was not
‘supervision’ and that the workers were, therefore, not entitled to the relevant benefits.48
Similarly, in the heavily criticized Almitra Patel case,49 the court prioritized the cleaning up of the city
over the welfare of a vulnerable community. In this case, the court handed down a series of orders
aimed at enforcing statutory obligations regarding the cleaning up of the city of Delhi, which suffers
*I.C.L.Q. 393 from notoriously high levels of pollution. One of the issues in the case was the
management of domestic solid waste. In his judgment for the court, Kirpal J saw the existence of
slums as an obstacle to the cleaning up of the city, indicating that management of waste was made
more complicated when people lived in settlements with no proper means of disposing of domestic
waste and effluents.50 The court directed that steps be taken to improve the sanitation in the slums as
a temporary measure but made it clear that the goal was to get rid of them altogether as soon as
possible.51 Kirpal J ordered the government to ‘take appropriate steps’ to stop new illegal occupation
of public land52 and stated that ‘[r]ewarding an encroacher on public land with a free alternate site is
like giving a reward to a pickpocket’.53 The court's complete failure to consider what was to become of
the slum dwellers is worrying.54 The approach may be contrasted both with the Olga Tellis decision, in
which the court showed some concern for the need to provide pavement and slum dwellers with
alternative accommodation close to their places of work, and with the South African Constitutional
Court's decisions on housing and evictions. In Grootboom 55 and President of the Republic of South
Africa v ModderklipBoerdery (Pty) Ltd, 56 the South African judges expressed concern about the illegal
occupation of land. They indicated that self-help was not to be viewed as an acceptable solution to
the country's housing problems and did not want to appear to be rewarding illegal occupiers at the
expense of those waiting to be allocated low-cost housing by the state. However, they balanced this
against the terrible circumstances in which the individuals concerned were living and the length of
time for which they had been waiting for lawful housing.
Finally, many commentators consider the Indian Supreme Court's long and complex history with the
Sardar Sarovar Dam Project to be a low point in the court's record. In its 2000 decision Narmada
Bachao Andolan v Union of India, 57 the court approved ‘the largest Court-sanctioned forced eviction
in the world’58 in the face of evidence that the government had not attained environmental clearance
for the project or done much to secure the rehabilitation of the displaced peoples, both of which were
legally required.59 The Ministry of Environment and Forests had given conditional clearance for the
dam project in 1987. In response to concerns raised by Narmada Bachao Andolan, the
non-governmental organization which ultimately filed the case with the Supreme Court, government
set up a group to look into *I.C.L.Q. 394 the environmental issues and the questions around
rehabilitation of displaced persons.60 The group noted that the height of the dam could make the
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social costs of displacement and rehabilitation too burdensome to manage effectively but
recommended that government's plan for a phased construction go ahead on the basis that the
situation be monitored and that construction would be halted if became clear that the height of the
dam would result in problems too difficult to solve.61
Justice Kirpal criticized Narmada Bachao Andolan for bringing the case to court seven years after the
construction of the dam had begun.62 According to him, this delay meant that the only proper question
for the court was whether the government's rehabilitation and relief measures were being properly
implemented, consistently with the affected parties' Article 21 rights. In other words, the court would
not address the concerns about the construction of the dam itself.63 In making this decision, the court
failed to recognize that the question of effective rehabilitation was inseparable from the question of
whether the construction should go ahead as originally planned. The petitioners were arguing that the
building of the dam at the planned height would result in a displacement problem impossible for
government to manage. Furthermore, the court did not acknowledge that the reason for the delay was
that the organization was engaging in an ongoing process with government to try to get a
comprehensive assessment of the project.
In spite of this effective throwing out of a large part of the petitioner's case, the court went on to
discuss the organization's contentions on the impact of the project on the environment and on
displaced peoples. One of the main arguments presented by Narmada Bachao Andolan was that
there had never been an independent assessment of the impact of the project.64 The court's response
to this was that soliciting the views of independent experts was unnecessary as there was no reason
to question the accuracy of the governmental studies or to believe that the government would not be
able to manage any problems that arose.65
On the Article 21 argument, the court took at face value the government's assertions that the project
would ultimately benefit the people displaced by the construction of the dam and found that their right
to life was not under threat.66 Justice Kirpal chose not to engage with the petitioner's submissions that
the rehabilitation programme was fundamentally flawed and that the alleged benefits were in doubt.67
Judicial caution in the face of large, complex projects like this is to be expected. In some of its recent
jurisprudence, the South African CC has had to consider the reasonableness of such projects in the
light of claims about their *I.C.L.Q. 395 detrimental impact on individuals; and poor management,
including a failure to live up to promises made to the affected parties. In the Joe Slovo case, decided
in 2009, about 20,000 residents of the Joe Slovo informal settlement in the Western Cape challenged
a governmental programme aimed at developing low-cost housing on the site. The programme was
part of a nationwide project aimed at eliminating unsafe, unhygienic informal settlements and
replacing them with permanent, affordable housing. The laudable aims of the project, as well as
concern for the impact of further delay on residents who had already moved away from the Joe Slovo
settlement voluntarily, weighed heavily with the judges. They ordered that the remaining residents be
evicted, despite glaring problems with the implementation of the project.68 But what sets this decision
apart from that in Narmada Bachao Andolan is that the South African Constitutional Court was careful
to frame a remedy which detailed the quality of the temporary accommodation and required
government to engage with the residents about the timing of the evictions, amongst other things.69
Ultimately, the South African government decided to upgrade the settlement whilst the residents
remained on site, effectively acceding to one of the main demands made by the group which had
brought the case to the Constitutional Court. Sustained pressure from the Joe Slovo community
played a very significant role in bringing about this change to governmental policy. The government
may well have ignored the court's instruction that further engagement with the community take place
in the absence of this pressure. But, the tenor of the judgment is important. The Indian Supreme
Court's censure of the petitioners in Narmada Bachao Andolan and absolute trust in the capacity and
good faith of government left the petitioners with little further recourse. By contrast, in Joe Slovo, the
South African Constitutional Court made it clear that the government had a continuing responsibility to
engage with the affected community and to provide them with good-quality temporary
accommodation. This gave the community some tools with which to continue fighting for on-site
upgrading. Ultimately, the government was forced to acknowledge the flaws in the original
programme.
The Indian Supreme Court cases discussed in this section do not represent a complete retreat from
activism in protecting ESR. Recent jurisprudence on the Right to Food70 is held up as an example of
the effective use of the courts to widen access to socio-economic goods. The Human Rights Law
Network began the public interest litigation on the right to food by filing a writ petition in the Supreme
Court in April 2001.71 At the time, India's grain stocks were overflowing and in danger of being
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dumped into the sea or eaten by rats.72 *I.C.L.Q. 396 Yet India's rural population was experiencing a
famine-malnutrition was common and people were dying of starvation.73 A Famine Code and various
schemes for distribution of food were already in place but were not being implemented by
government.74 The People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) asked for immediate release of the
surplus food stocks.75 The legal basis for the claim was Article 21. Using its ‘continuous mandamus’
jurisdiction, the court has kept the case open and made periodic orders aimed at ensuring that the
remedies it hands down are enforced.76 The most important of these orders was that handed down on
28 November 2001.77 The order converted the schemes' benefits into legal entitlements.78
The November 2001 order dealt with eight schemes.79 Each of the schemes centred on some aspect
of food distribution as it related to a particular social group. The Midday Meals Scheme, for example,
was directed at providing midday meals for all children in primary schools.80 The court ordered
government to make good defects in the implementation of these schemes--by completing the
identification of people who fell into the targeted groups, issuing cards to allow them to collect the
grain and distributing the grain to the relevant centres.81 The court also ordered that those states
which had been providing dry rations for the midday meal in schools begin providing cooked meals
within three months of the order. Aspects of the order also dealt with inspection by government to
ensure fair-quality grain and replacement of grain that did not meet this standard.82 In this and
subsequent orders, the court has also set out requirements on reporting, accountability, monitoring,
transparency and dissemination of court orders aimed at ensuring that its orders are followed.83
The Right to Food case certainly indicates that the history of the Supreme Court cannot be neatly
divided into activist and non-activist phases. But there are several points to be made about the
context of the case. For one thing, whilst the court has accepted the idea that the right to life contains
a right to food,84 its remedies focus on the provision of grain to people who are without food in a
national context of abundant food stocks. Furthermore, the litigation is primarily aimed at forcing
government to fulfil its pre-existing guarantees and there are no competing ‘big business’ or national
development interests for the court to grapple with. PUCL has gone back to court repeatedly due to
delays in compliance; non-compliance with the orders; or governmental *I.C.L.Q. 397 decisions to
remove people from the list of those ‘Below the Poverty Line’, for example. As the litigation is
ongoing, any overall assessment of its effectiveness will have to wait but the court orders must be
read within this wider context.
There have been some promising developments in the context of the right to education. In State of
Bihar and Ors v Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak Sangh and Ors, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the Constitution only recognized education as a fundamental right for children under age 14 but
held that ‘education as a part of human development indisputably is a human right’.85 The case arose
in the context of the State of Bihar's decision to establish ‘Project Schools’, including a specified
number of girls' schools, as a response to its poor progress in the area of education. In light of
deviations from this policy, the court ordered that a committee be appointed to investigate the matter.
The court's order included details as to the composition of the committee, its brief, some guidelines as
to what would constitute irregularities in the implementation of the state's policy and an expectation
that the state of Bihar would take appropriate action in the event of the committee finding such
irregularities.86
The court's approach to affirmative action in education is also instructive. In Ashoka Thakur v Union of
India 87 the court upheld the 93rd Amendment to the Constitution, which allows for special measures
to be taken for the advancement of India's ‘socially or educationally backward classes of citizens or
for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their
admission to the educational institutions’.88 At the same time, the court held that the ‘creamy layer’
should be excluded from the 27 per cent quota for ‘Other Backward Classes’ (OBC)89 and that the
inclusion of particular groups in the OBC category be reviewed every five years.90 The term ‘creamy
layer’ refers to those people within the OBC category who are relatively wealthier and better
educated.91 The concern was that people in this group would always be the beneficiaries of
governmental *I.C.L.Q. 398 reservations policies, and that, as a result, the position of the most
desperately poor would remain unchanged. Although the court left the government a wide discretion
in deciding which people fell within the ‘creamy layer’,92 its approach was certainly less deferential
than in some of the cases referred to above.
Some of the most interesting recent developments with respect to the right to health have occurred in
the context of HIV/AIDS. In 2003, the Punjab Voluntary Health Centre, represented by the Human
Rights Law Network (HRLN), petitioned the Supreme Court to order the government to provide free
anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) to HIV-positive people.93 On 5 August 2008, the court approved a list of
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commitments regarding the treatment and other forms of support for people living with HIV/AIDS
which were made by the government and put before the court. HRLN welcomed the response but
expressed concern about a lack of provision of second-line treatment that is, a different combination
of ARVs for those people who have become resistant to their initial medication or who are suffering
serious side effects.94 Another petition, filed in 1999 by Lawyers' Collective, acting on behalf of
Sankalp Rehabilitation Trust, was initially aimed at removing obstacles to the treatment of HIV-
positive people in hospitals. According to Lawyers' Collective, ‘this PIL [public interest litigation] has
been sought to be used as an oversight mechanism for the National ARV Rollout Programme and a
number of issues affecting access to treatment have been addressed’.95 At the court's request, the
Sankalp Rehabilitation Trust filed the directions it sought before the court in 2008. There followed a
number of meetings between the National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO), people living with
HIV/AIDS and representatives of the office of the Solicitor-General of India and Lawyers' Collective.
These stakeholders agreed upon 14 points which were then endorsed by the court. In another order,
Sankalp Rehabilitation Trust filed an application arguing that NACO guidelines restricting the
provision of second-line ARV treatment to four categories of people amounted to discrimination and
violated the right to life. The court indicated that the scheme was impermissible and, in a series of
discussions, NACO agreed to widen access to second-line treatment to all people who needed it.96
On 2 December 2013, the Supreme *I.C.L.Q. 399 Court disposed of the petition but gave Sankalp
Rehabilitation Trust permission to make a separate submission on four issues which had not been
resolved in consultation between the parties. Further litigation is likely and there remain significant
problems with implementation97 of the orders issued thus far but the institution of the litigation, the
interim orders handed down by the court and dialogue between interested parties have already
resulted in a widening of access to HIV/AIDS treatment in governmental policy.
IV. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: A SITE OF BETRAYAL?98
As noted earlier, recent scholarship acknowledges the achievements of the court in some of its
watershed rulings on social and economic equality but raises a number of concerns about the impact
and coherence of its ESR jurisprudence. Studies convincingly demonstrate that non-governmental
organizations are slow to turn to the courts99 because of institutional challenges such as the high cost
of litigation and the massive delays in getting a judgment at all.100 The courts are overloaded and,
contrary to the popular belief that India is a highly litigious society, the delays in getting a final
judgment are due mainly to the fact that there are not enough judges and courts.101
A second criticism of Indian Supreme Court ESR jurisprudence focuses on a lack of principle in
judicial reasoning.102 It is extremely difficult to ascertain when and how the court will make use of the
directive principles.103 ESR have not always been attributed to the directive principles and it is, thus,
unclear where they derive from, making it difficult for future litigants to be certain of their legal
position.104 Furthermore, the court has sometimes extended remedies granted against the
government to States that were not represented in court.105 This tendency to hand down judgments
without fully considering their implications is one of the main reasons why the efficacy of the court's
approach to ESR is doubtful. The huge backlog of cases in India,106 is due, in part, to the fact that
cases are often repeatedly brought back to court for ‘fine-tuning’ or because judgments have not been
enforced, the court having failed *I.C.L.Q. 400 to accurately assess the wider implications of their
earlier orders.107 Moreover, it is often not clear why the judges found they had the (institutional and
constitutional) capacity108 to act in particular cases and not in others. Instead, deference to the
executive occurs on an ad hoc basis.109 This makes it more difficult for litigators and activists to
identify and rely on a coherent body of ESR jurisprudence when making arguments before the courts.
A third concern is that, alongside the court's much-praised ‘pro-poor’ judgments, sit a number of
cases in which judges have upheld the interests of big business or national development against the
ESR of the poor and vulnerable. As Upendra Baxi puts it ‘[j]udicial activism is at once a peril and a
promise, an assurance of solidarity for the depressed classes of Indian society as well as a site of
betrayal’.110 Based on a recent empirical assessment of Indian Supreme Court cases, Varun Gauri
notes that there is a trend for the judges to look upon claims made on behalf of the poor and
marginalized members of society less favourably. Whilst it is possible that this may be attributed to
factors such as the relative weakness of the claims brought before the courts, a corresponding
increase in successful judgments for more advantaged persons suggests that the court is generally
less disposed to come to the assistance of people living in poverty.111 Increasingly, judges of the
Supreme Court cite policy considerations as justification for minimal or no scrutiny of government
action.112 Economic liberalization and a governmental emphasis on sustainable development have
had a significant impact on judicial decisions-land reform, housing and tribal rights take a back seat to
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these concerns in an increasing number of cases.113
These explanations for the court's inconsistent approach to the adjudication of economic and social
guarantees are relatively well rehearsed. In a more recent attempt to understand what others have
referred to as the court's ad hoc approach to economic and social rights adjudication, Madhav Khosla
suggests that the approach is conditional upon whether the state has taken action to implement the
rights. This is an unusual approach, analogous to the *I.C.L.Q. 401 adjudication of contract or tort
cases in private law. The court will hand down a remedy when the state has breached an undertaking
to take certain action (to provide shelter to slum dwellers, for instance) or when the state has been
negligent--for example, by not maintaining a hospital it chose to build.114 Where prior state action
allows the court to conclude that a duty exists and has been breached, its remedial capacity is
wide--illustrated by the use of the continuing mandamus referred to earlier and by innovative
remedies such as compensation.115
However, the conditional social rights thesis does not, and arguably was not intended to provide a
complete explanation for inconsistencies in the court's approach. Even where there has been some
prior governmental undertaking on access to housing, health care, rehabilitation education and so on,
the court's approach to both reasoning and remedy can vary quite dramatically. In the Right to Food
case, for example, the court has gone as far as setting out the number of calories a midday meal
provided to schoolchildren should contain.116 In Olga Tellis, the court was content to effectively make
government's undertakings an order of court. Second, the approach does not account for the court's
treatment of the Narmada Bachao Andolan case. As discussed earlier in this article, the court ordered
that eviction go ahead despite glaring omissions in the state's legal undertakings. By contrast, the
court has been willing to interrogate, and place restrictions on, governmental policy on affirmative
action in the context of education.117 And, in the ongoing litigation on HIV treatment discussed earlier,
the court has played an important role in driving the process forward by asking Sankalp Rehabilitation
Trust to place the directions it was seeking before the court. This acted as a catalyst for dialogue with
interest holders and that dialogue, in turn, framed government's commitments with respect to access
to ARVs.
The question of whether there has been some state action which the court can use as a reference
point for deciding a case is only one factor that informs the extent to which the court will adopt an
interventionist or more deferential approach. The role of this factor and the existence and role of other
factors influencing levels of judicial restraint remain under-analysed in the cases and literature.
Moreover, it is clear that there are important discrepancies in the attitudes of individual judges to the
nature and limits of the judicial role. The seriousness of the disagreement amongst judges about their
role is illustrated in a number of recent Supreme Court pronouncements. *I.C.L.Q. 402 The Delhi Jal
Board case118 arose in the context of the work-related deaths of, and injuries to, people hired to work
in the sewers by companies contracted to government.119 The Delhi High Court had ordered the
relevant governmental authorities to provide the contract workers with protective equipment, arrange
for them to undergo free medical examinations and pay compensation to the families of the victims.120
Counsel for the government argued that this amounted to the court assuming legislative powers.121 In
a 12 July 2011 judgment, Justice Singhvi noted that the drafting of legislative measures aimed at
securing the constitutional goal of social and economic equality is sluggish and, when such measures
are in place, they tend to remain unimplemented.122 Furthermore, when courts attempt to fill the
ensuing gap, they are often confronted with ‘the bogey of judicial activism or judicial overreach’.123
The court concluded that, in handing down the impugned order, the High Court had simply exercised
its ‘obligation to do justice to the disadvantaged and poor sections of the society’.124 But this
statement of support for strong judicial interventions in the interests of expanding social welfare does
not reflect a consensus within the Supreme Court.
In the much discussed 2007 case Aravali Golf Club and Another, 125 Justice Katju criticized the Delhi
High Court for straying ‘into the executive domain or in matters of policy’ by handing down orders on
age and other criteria for nursery admissions, unauthorized schools, criteria for free seats in schools,
supply of drinking water in schools, number of free beds in hospitals on public land, use and misuse
of ambulances, requirements for establishing a world class burns ward in the hospital, the kind of air
Delhities [sic] breathe, begging in public, the use of sub-ways, the nature of buses we board, the
legality of constructions in Delhi, identifying the buildings to be demolished, the size of
speed-breakers on Delhi roads, auto-rickshaw over-charging, growing frequency of road accidents
and enhancing of road fines etc.126
According to Katju J, these were all matters exclusively within the competence of the legislature or
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executive. All that judges were entitled to do was to enforce pre-existing laws in these areas.127
Justice Katju expressed a worry that judicial overzealousness could cause politicians to step in and
restrict judicial powers.128 He conceded that judicial activism can be a ‘useful adjunct to democracy’
but only in ‘exceptional circumstances when the situation forcefully demands it in the interest of the
nation or the poorer and weaker sections of society’.129
*I.C.L.Q. 403 This aspect of the judgment has provoked a strong reaction in certain quarters.130
Justice Katju has come under criticism for pronouncing on matters not before him, some of which
were yet to be decided by the Delhi High Court.131 Furthermore, given the fact that the marginalization
of the interests of the poor and weak is anything but exceptional in India and that a number of the
High Court cases Katju J referred to dealt precisely with matters impacting on the everyday lives of
vulnerable citizens, it is difficult to see where the judge thought the line between judicial responsibility
and judicial overreach should be drawn.
An acknowledgement of the need for the court to exercise restraint in appropriate cases is
reconcilable with the conviction that the court has a duty to step in when people like the sewerage
workers in Delhi Jal Board are left without any protection. But the cases discussed here highlight the
difficulties with defining the limits of the judicial role in ESR cases. As noted earlier, the South African
Constitutional Court has also struggled with this issue. In what is arguably its most criticized ESR
judgment to date, Mazibuko, 132 the South African Constitutional Court was called upon to decide
whether a complex project aimed at overhauling the system of water provision in the city of
Johannesburg was constitutional.133 The applicants, from Phiri Township in Soweto, where the project
was initiated, argued that the government's free basic water allocation was insufficient in the light of
the purposes to which it would be put and the number of people dependent on it. Summarizing the
court's approach to the state's positive obligations in respect of the ESR in the Constitution to date,
Justice O'Regan held that courts would ‘at least’ require government to take steps to realize those
rights where no steps were being taken and would review unreasonable measures to ensure that they
met the standard of reasonableness.134 Furthermore, government had to regularly reassess its
policies to check that those policies were capable of progressively *I.C.L.Q. 404 realizing the rights.
Courts would find government action that did not make provision for those in desperate need to be
unreasonable and would order government to remove any unreasonable limitations or exclusions
from its ESR policies.135 The court noted that a challenge to the reasonableness of government action
required government to explain its choices by providing the information it had considered in making
those choices and describing the process it had followed in formulating its policy.136
As a description of the Court's general approach to ESR adjudication, the judgment in Mazibuko
suggested that a form of light-touch review, placing little more than a burden of explanation on
governmental authorities, was the only appropriate role for the courts in this area. However, two
points must be made here. First, this deferential approach may still be distinguished from the kind of
non-justiciability doctrine advocated by Justice Katju in the Aravali Golf Club case and effectively
followed by the Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan. Second, subsequent decisions have indicated
that the South African CC's account of its reasonableness-based approach to ESR in Mazibuko was
driven by the circumstances of the case and was not an indication that there could be no robust
scrutiny of governmental decisions in ESR cases. In the subsequent Blue Moonlight decision,137 for
instance, the Constitutional Court rejected government's argument that it did not have the resources
to provide emergency housing for people ejected from private property. The court noted that the City
of Johannesburg should have made provision for this kind of housing in its budget. It also stated that
the City had not provided sufficient evidence of a general, rather than housing-specific, financial
deficit. In addition, although the Court has traditionally resisted calls to order supervisory jurisdiction
because of the potential of such jurisdiction to allow courts to usurp executive powers,138 it has been
more willing to use this relatively exacting remedy in recent cases.139
Attitudes to the limits of the judicial role within any apex court need to be responsive to the particular
features of a case and to changes in the political climate. However, the differences in the approach of
various Indian Supreme Court judges do not merely concern the question of what level of scrutiny is
appropriate in cases involving ESR. The differences suggest that there is fundamental disagreement
about whether judges have a role to play in this *I.C.L.Q. 405 area at all. The fact that the South
African Constitution makes ESR directly justiciable means that there is no longer scope for arguing
that ESR are immune from judicial interpretation and implementation. But in India, giving effect to the
ESR recognized as directive principles of state policy was a judicial move, not a legislative one.
Adjudication of ESR is therefore much more controversial in this jurisdiction. And the need for some
clarity about the extent of the judicial role in Indian ESR cases is that much more pressing because of
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this.
V. LESSONS FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION
The Indian Supreme Court's early ESR jurisprudence occupies an important space within legal
scholarship. The court's willingness to interpret civil and political rights in light of the directive
principles of state policy was an innovation. The novelty of the approach is perhaps what led
advocates of justiciable ESR to claim more for the Indian jurisprudence than is strictly accurate. The
court was cautious in terms of the consequences it attached to the new status of the directive
principles.
Despite this more modest appraisal and the flaws identified in section IV above, non-governmental
organizations working in this area are quick to affirm the benefits of a judicial precedent recognizing
access to goods such as housing and health care and imposing corresponding duties on government.
140 Gauri cautions against critiques that contrast idealized, unrealistic forms of legislative action with
actual judicial interventions. The latter may be imperfect but nonetheless valuable and are usually
sought because of the ‘real world failings’ of legislative and executive bodies.141 Even relatively weak
remedies such as those used by the court in Olga Tellis may give rise to concrete benefits for those
persons affected by government action. Thus, in terms of the Supreme Court's order, certain of the
petitioners in that case had to be provided with alternative accommodation upon their removal from
the sites.
Neuborne refers to the Court's break with traditional adversarial modes of litigation--the relaxation of
the rules of standing, flexible pleading rules, new methods of fact finding and expanded remedial
powers as the real ‘groundbreaking event’ of the PIL movement.142 A continued attachment to an
adversarial approach, resulting in limited access to courts for the most vulnerable members of society,
is an important weakness of the South African legal system.143 Furthermore, as noted by the South
African Constitutional Court in the Treatment Action Campaign decision, ‘[e]ven a cursory perusal of
the relevant Indian case law demonstrates a willingness on the part of the Indian courts to grant
far-reaching remedial orders’ including ‘highly detailed *I.C.L.Q. 406 mandatory and structural
injunctions’.144 This kind of supervisory jurisdiction is something the South African Constitutional Court
has only recently begun to implement.145 Apart from requiring governmental bodies to report to the
courts on their progress, the Indian Supreme Court has also appointed socio-legal commissions to
conduct research into complex matters. These remedies are an attempt to preserve respect for the
democratic authority of legislative bodies and the expertise of executive authorities, whilst at the same
time, moving the implementation of social and economic guarantees forward. Such remedies tend to
be time-consuming and their short-term impact is difficult to gauge. But they do have the effect of
encouraging an ongoing debate between stakeholders (civil society, government bodies, lawyers,
judges) about how best to broaden access to goods such as shelter, education, water, food, etc.
Furthermore, they play an educative role in generating societal acceptance of the importance of ESR
and of the fact that government has duties with respect to these rights.
The lesson here is that social advocacy groups need to consider how best to use the courts, with all
their limitations, in creating greater access to socio-economic goods. To date, the most successful
legal interventions have been those which
envisioned ‘strategic’ operations of a scale, scope, and continuity that enabled lawyers to acquire
specialized experience, coordinate efforts on several fronts, select targets and manage the sequence
and pace of litigation, monitor developments and deploy resources to maximize the long-term
advantage of a client group.146
The Right to Food campaign in India and the work of the Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa
are good examples here. The 2001 drought in India left large numbers of people facing starvation in
the knowledge that government was allowing excess grain stocks to rot. This galvanized disparate
groups and individuals into a ‘full-fledged Right to Food campaign’.147 As Colin Gonsalves, founding
director of the Human Rights Law Network, the organization which has been driving the right to food
litigation in India, notes ‘[t]he Court's four initial orders lifted our morale and spurred a national
campaign on the right to food that was subterranean and waiting for something to set off a chain
reaction’.148 The court's willingness to hand down creative monitoring remedies in the case and the
Human Rights Law Network's *I.C.L.Q. 407 capacity to follow up on these by returning to court on
numerous occasions also contributed to the relative success of the litigation. Similar lessons about
the value of a multi-pronged strategy for the implementation of social and economic rights are
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apparent from the work of the Treatment Action Campaign in broadening access to anti-retroviral
drugs in South Africa. This organization has used a combination of protest, lobbying, litigation and the
threat of litigation to further its aims.149
In sum then, whilst Supreme Court judges' pronouncements on ESR are more modest than has
sometimes been suggested, the court has made a significant contribution to the implementation of
these rights. But the question of whether the court will continue to play a useful role in the kinds of
‘strategic operations’ referred to above is complicated by two concerns. First, there is the courts' ad
hoc approach to judicial activism. With respect to the Right to Food case, Colin Gonsalves recalls
advising a colleague not to talk about the case ‘because the chances were high of the Supreme Court
rejecting the petition %Y(3)27 [w]hat we didn't factor into our calculation was Justice B.N. Kirpal who
unexpectedly took up the case with gusto’.150 The fact that so much turns on the attitudes of individual
judges makes for a huge amount of uncertainty for those thinking about bringing a case. In addition, if
the government is arbitrarily held to account for failing in its duty to implement ESR in one case but
not in another, there is little opportunity for the rights to become ‘mainstreamed’. A culture of following
good administrative practice and considering the impact of policies on individuals' rights--say, when
removing residents from unhygienic settlements--has a significantly better chance of taking root within
governmental bodies when judges enumerate state duties clearly and consistently.
Coupled to this is a second concern--the inconsistent approach to judicial activism makes it easier for
judges to use judicial deference as an excuse to sacrifice the social and economic interests of poor
litigants when these conflict with the interests of multinational companies or with major governmental
projects. Sustained engagement with the issues raised in the Aravali Golf Club case would produce
more nuanced arguments about when robust judicial intervention is needed and when a more
restrained route should be followed. Then Chief Justice Balakrishnan's announcement in 2007 that he
would appoint a larger bench of the Supreme Court to formulate PIL guidelines following the decision
in that case held the promise of initiating *I.C.L.Q. 408 a serious debate about judicial activism.151 But
such guidelines have yet to be produced.
The extensive debate preceding the inclusion of ESR in the South African Constitution, and the
drafters' decision to incorporate internal limitations modelled on the ICESCR in the ESR provisions,152
meant that the South African Constitutional Court had to engage with debates about the limits of the
judicial role in this area from the very early years of its existence.153 This comparatively greater
deliberation about the appropriate role of the judiciary in South African ESR cases has produced a
jurisprudence which, whilst still marred by some inconsistency and problematic reasoning, does not
suffer from the radical divergences in approach reflected in the Indian cases. The reasons for this are
complex. For instance, institutional differences between the two courts, such as the fact that the
judges of the South African Constitutional Court always sit as a single bench whereas the Indian
Supreme Court hears a large number of cases as two-judge Division benches, are significant.154 But
the primary argument here is that the profound differences in judge's views about judicial intervention
and restraint is an issue which deserves much more serious attention.
It is unlikely that the Indian Supreme Court will initiate a debate about the judicial role without serious
pressure from other quarters being brought to bear upon the judges.155 It is important that those
bringing cases before the Indian Supreme Court regenerate interest in such a debate by explicitly
addressing arguments pertaining to the limits of the judicial role to the court. Rather than simply
finding that policy factors are a complete bar to justiciability, then, judges will be required to justify the
level of scrutiny they apply to governmental action by reference to a series of relevant factors such as
the impact of that action on the affected parties, the number of people affected, the extent to which
important policy considerations are actually in issue, the question of whether the subject matter of the
case gives rise to serious resource implications and whether the state is flouting commitments it has
already agreed to. The development of a more principled approach to judicial activism is to be
encouraged as an integral part of an effective model for ESR adjudication in India and elsewhere.
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